VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Actionwith the Other Main Centers of Global Power“We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th centuryto build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”President BushWest Point, New YorkJune 1, 2002America will implement its strategies byorganizing coalitions—as broad as practicable—of states able and willing to promote a balance ofpower that favors freedom. Effective coalitionleadership requires clear priorities, an appreciationof others’ interests, and consistent consultationsamong partners with a spirit of humility.There is little of lasting consequence that theUnited States can accomplish in the world withoutthe sustained cooperation of its allies and friendsin Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat oftwo of the strongest and most able internationalinstitutions in the world: the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO), which has, since its inception,been the fulcrum of transatlantic andinter-European security, and the European Union(EU), our partner in opening world trade.The attacks of September 11 were also anattack on NATO, as NATO itself recognized whenit invoked its Article V self-defense clause for thefirst time. NATO’s core mission—collectivedefense of the transatlantic alliance of democracies—remains, but NATO must develop newstructures and capabilities to carry out thatmission under new circumstances. NATO mustbuild a capability to field, at short notice, highlymobile, specially trained forces whenever they areneeded to respond to a threat against any memberof the alliance.The alliance must be able to act wherever ourinterests are threatened, creating coalitions underNATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing tomission-based coalitions. To achieve this, we must:expand NATO’s membership to thosedemocratic nations willing and able to sharethe burden of defending and advancing ourcommon interests;ensure that the military forces of NATOnations have appropriate combatcontributions to make in coalition warfare;develop planning processes to enablethose contributions to become effectivemultinational fighting forces;take advantage of the technological opportunitiesand economies of scale in our defensespending to transform NATO military forcesso that they dominate potential aggressorsand diminish our vulnerabilities;streamline and increase the flexibilityof command structures to meet newoperational demands and the associatedrequirements of training, integrating,and experimenting with new forceconfigurations; andmaintain the ability to work and fighttogether as allies even as we take thenecessary steps to transform and modernizeour forces.If NATO succeeds in enacting these changes,the rewards will be a partnership as central to thesecurity and interests of its member states as wasthe case during the Cold War.We will sustain acommon perspective on the threats to our societiesand improve our ability to take commonaction in defense of our nations and their interests.At the same time, we welcome our Europeanallies’ efforts to forge a greater foreign policy anddefense identity with the EU, and commitourselves to close consultations to ensure thatthese developments work with NATO.We cannotafford to lose this opportunity to better preparethe family of transatlantic democracies for thechallenges to come.The attacks of September 11 energizedAmerica’s Asian alliances. Australia invoked theANZUS Treaty to declare the September 11 was anattack on Australia itself, following that historicdecision with the dispatch of some of the world’sfinest combat forces for Operation EnduringFreedom. Japan and the Republic of Koreaprovided unprecedented levels of militarylogistical support within weeks of the terroristattack.We have deepened cooperation on counterterrorismwith our alliance partners in Thailandand the Philippines and received invaluableassistance from close friends like Singapore andNew Zealand.The war against terrorism has proven thatAmerica’s alliances in Asia not only underpinregional peace and stability, but are flexible andready to deal with new challenges. To enhance ourAsian alliances and friendships, we will:look to Japan to continue forging a leadingrole in regional and global affairs based onour common interests, our common values,and our close defense and diplomaticcooperation;work with South Korea to maintain vigilancetowards the North while preparing ouralliance to make contributions to thebroader stability of the region over thelonger term;build on 50 years of U.S.-Australian alliancecooperation as we continue workingtogether to resolve regional and globalproblems—as we have so many times fromthe Battle of the Coral Sea to Tora Bora;maintain forces in the region that reflectour commitments to our allies, our requirements,our technological advances, and thestrategic environment; andbuild on stability provided by these alliances,as well as with institutions such as ASEANand the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperationforum, to develop a mix of regional andbilateral strategies to manage change in thisdynamic region.We are attentive to the possible renewal of oldpatterns of great power competition. Severalpotential great powers are now in the midst ofinternal transition—most importantly Russia,India, and China. In all three cases, recent developmentshave encouraged our hope that a trulyglobal consensus about basic principles is slowlytaking shape.With Russia, we are already building a newstrategic relationship based on a central reality ofthe twenty-first century: the United States andRussia are no longer strategic adversaries. TheMoscow Treaty on Strategic Reductions isemblematic of this new reality and reflects a criticalchange in Russian thinking that promises tolead to productive, long-term relations with theEuro-Atlantic community and the United States.Russia’s top leaders have a realistic assessment oftheir country’s current weakness and thepolicies—internal and external—needed to reversethose weaknesses. They understand, increasingly,that Cold War approaches do not serve theirnational interests and that Russian and Americanstrategic interests overlap in many areas.United States policy seeks to use this turn inRussian thinking to refocus our relationship onemerging and potential common interests andchallenges.We are broadening our already extensivecooperation in the global war on terrorism.We are facilitating Russia’s entry into the WorldTrade Organization, without lowering standardsfor accession, to promote beneficial bilateral tradeand investment relations.We have created theNATO-Russia Council with the goal of deepeningsecurity cooperation among Russia, our Europeanallies, and ourselves.We will continue to bolsterthe independence and stability of the states of theformer Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperousand stable neighborhood will reinforceRussia’s growing commitment to integration intothe Euro-Atlantic community.At the same time, we are realistic about thedifferences that still divide us from Russia andabout the time and effort it will take to build anenduring strategic partnership. Lingering distrustof our motives and policies by key Russian elitesslows improvement in our relations. Russia’suneven commitment to the basic values offree-market democracy and dubious record incombating the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction remain matters of great concern.Russia’s very weakness limits the opportunitiesfor cooperation. Nevertheless, those opportunitiesare vastly greater now than in recent years—oreven decades.The United States has undertaken a transformationin its bilateral relationship with Indiabased on a conviction that U.S. interests require astrong relationship with India.We are the twolargest democracies, committed to politicalfreedom protected by representative government.India is moving toward greater economic freedomas well.We have a common interest in the freeflow of commerce, including through the vital sealanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share aninterest in fighting terrorism and in creating astrategically stable Asia.Differences remain, including over the developmentof India’s nuclear and missile programs, andthe pace of India’s economic reforms. But while inthe past these concerns may have dominated ourthinking about India, today we start with a viewof India as a growing world power with which wehave common strategic interests. Through astrong partnership with India, we can best addressany differences and shape a dynamic future.The United States relationship with China isan important part of our strategy to promote astable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia-Pacificregion.We welcome the emergence of a strong,peaceful, and prosperous China. The democraticdevelopment of China is crucial to that future. Yet,a quarter century after beginning the process ofshedding the worst features of the Communistlegacy, China’s leaders have not yet made the nextseries of fundamental choices about the characterof their state. In pursuing advanced militarycapabilities that can threaten its neighbors in theAsia-Pacific region, China is following an outdatedpath that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuitof national greatness. In time, China will find thatsocial and political freedom is the only source ofthat greatness.The United States seeks a constructive relationshipwith a changing China.We already cooperatewell where our interests overlap, including thecurrent war on terrorism and in promotingstability on the Korean peninsula. Likewise, wehave coordinated on the future of Afghanistanand have initiated a comprehensive dialogue oncounterterrorism and similar transitionalconcerns. Shared health and environmentalthreats, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, challengeus to promote jointly the welfare of our citizens.Addressing these transnational threats will challenge China to become more open withinformation, promote the development of civilsociety, and enhance individual human rights.China has begun to take the road to politicalopenness, permitting many personal freedoms andconducting village-level elections, yet remainsstrongly committed to national one-party rule bythe Communist Party. To make that nation trulyaccountable to its citizen’s needs and aspirations,however, much work remains to be done. Only byallowing the Chinese people to think, assemble,and worship freely can China reach its full potential.Our important trade relationship will benefitfrom China’s entry into the World TradeOrganization, which will create more exportopportunities and ultimately more jobs forAmerican farmers, workers, and companies. Chinais our fourth largest trading partner, with over$100 billion in annual two-way trade. The powerof market principles and the WTO’s requirementsfor transparency and accountability will advanceopenness and the rule of law in China to helpestablish basic protections for commerce and forcitizens. There are, however, other areas in whichwe have profound disagreements. Our commitmentto the self-defense of Taiwan under the TaiwanRelations Act is one. Human rights is another.Weexpect China to adhere to its nonproliferationcommitments.We will work to narrow differenceswhere they exist, but not allow them to precludecooperation where we agree.The events of September 11, 2001, fundamentallychanged the context for relations between theUnited States and other main centers of globalpower, and opened vast, new opportunities.Withour long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, andwith leaders in Russia, India, and China, we mustdevelop active agendas of cooperation lest theserelationships become routine and unproductive.Every agency of the United States Governmentshares the challenge.We can build fruitful habitsof consultation, quiet argument, sober analysis,and common action. In the long-term, these arethe practices that will sustain the supremacy ofour common principles and keep open the pathof progress.
A WAR FOR YOUR BRAIN IN POLITICS, AND THE WEAPON OF CHOICE IS LANGUAGE: BE READY
2ff7e9595c
Comments